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Executive summary 
 
The paper reviews recent publications on the causes for the 2007308 food price crisis and the volatility of 
food grain prices. The focus of the paper is on the role strategic food grain storage at national, regional 
and global level may play in responding to food crises, ensuring food security crises and stabilizing food 
grain prices in markets at different levels.  
Chapter 6 gives an executive summary of conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
 Background 1 
1 Background 
 
The 2007/08 Food Price crisis led to increased concern about development of global food security and 
the risks of price hikes in global and domestic food markets, which have seriously affected poor people 
and countries and which have led occasionally to political instability. Since the crisis ,volatility in food grain 
markets has become the subject of an ongoing policy debate involving politically sensitive issues such as 
market (de3)regulation, export bans and maintaining strategic reserve stocks.  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, operating public controlled strategic food grain reserves as an instrument 
to control prices was discouraged in the context of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation policies. 
In the present debate questions are raised whether (re3) establishment of such reserves would contribute 
to prevent similar steep food price hikes and ensure food security in future. In order to assist in its policy 
regarding this issue, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation has requested 
Wageningen UR to implement a desk review.  
The central question in this review is: Should the Dutch government support the (re3) establishment of 
public sector held food grain reserves, and if so at what levels, under what conditions and in combination 
with which complementary actions or programmes?  
To put the role of (strategic) food grain reserves in perspective, this paper starts with a brief outline of the 
causes of the 2007308 Food Price Crises and the expected long3term developments in global food 
production and markets. This is followed by an outline of the different policy aims that food grain reserves 
may serve and a categorization of the different types of food grain reserves and related instruments. A 
review of past experiences with maintaining public sector  held reserves illustrates the importance of the 
context in which food grain reserves at different levels operate. We then discuss the recent developments 
as well as recent multilateral policy proposals and formulate a number of conclusions and considerations 
that may assist the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation in formulating a position on the 
issue of strategic food grain reserves. 
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2 Food Security and Food Crises: causes and 
influences  
 
2.1 Emergency food crises  
Acute crises in food supply and food security are nearly almost always localised affairs, due to failed 
harvests as a result of natural disasters (drought, flood, storm, earthquakes etc.) or a result of social or 
political conflicts leading to breakdown of infrastructure and market functioning. Characteristically, such 
crises require very short3term supply of foods of a specific nature befitting the emergency situation and 
the local food patterns. Acute emergencies may develop into more or less ‘chronic emergencies’ that 
cannot be solved by supplies from local production or by restoration of normal market situations (e.g. in 
refugee camps). In both acute and chronic emergencies, food reserves can play a vital role.  
2.2 Food market crises 
Prices in food markets at all levels are volatile as a result of inelastic supply and demand. The world food 
grain market is a thin market in which only about 15% of the total global production/consumption is traded 
by a limited number of buyers and sellers (Meijerink and Danse, 2009). Nevertheless, price development in 
the world market influences domestic prices, especially those in developing countries which have varying 
domestic production and which therefore often depend on imports to ensure food security1. 
The 2007/08 global Food Price Crisis has led to a large number of publications and proposals analysing 
and debating causes, contributing factors and expected developments (Wiggins et al., 2010; Willoughby et 
al., 2009 ; Von Braun & Torero, 2009 ; Murphy, 2009 and 2010 ; de Schutter ,2010). There is however, 
no consensus about what the main causes have been or their importance (Wiggins et al., 2010).  
In analysing food market crises it is helpful to make a distinction between the long term underlying causes 
and short3term factors that trigger the actual crisis. 
On the long9 and medium term, production and supply will be influenced by:  
− global climate change which is expected to negatively affect production levels in agriculture through 
lower yields and climatic instability (droughts and floods) in both the large grain producing countries 
as well as tropical developing countries; 
− a levelling off of the productivity improvements in agriculture through research and innovation in the 
coming decades; 
− the global availability of fossil fuels and fertilizer ingredients which is expected to tighten, leading to 
further cost increases in food production and transport. 
On the consumption and demand side:  
− the global population is expected to increase from 6 billion to 9 billion people in 2050. Moreover the 
population growth rate in the poorer developing countries is (still) highest; 
− rapid economic growth in China, India and other developing economies is expected to lead to 
increased per capita food consumption and changes in food consumption patterns from plant3 to 
animal based foods leading to higher demands for animal feed; 
                                                 
1
 In more developed countries, where value addition through processing forms an important part of the value chain (e.g. EU , USA ), 
the effects of changes in raw material prices on consumer prices is usually more limited than in developing countries with a very short 
production consumption chain.  
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− an increasing demand for bio3fuel crops may lead to direct competition in food markets (e.g. maize, 
sugar, palm oil) but also to competition for land and water for production of 2nd and 3rd generation 
non3food bio3fuel crops such as grasses and wood. 
 
Besides these direct supply and demand factors, there are also important financial, political and legal 
factors that influence the functioning and stability of food grain markets and thus food security: 
− deregulation of food commodity markets in the recent past is argued to have led to speculation 
leading to price levels unjustified by the actual supply/demand situation; 
− market liberalisation through WTO regulations has given developing countries better access to 
western markets (e.g. sugar) but in the case of food grains, liberalization may disadvantage the small 
local producers in poorly functioning domestic and regional markets;  
− farming and export subsidies by exporting countries (US , EU) lead to price distortions;  
− in the poorer and often importing developing countries, market infrastructure (storage, transport, 
information, processing) is often poorly developed and domestic markets are influenced or 
dominated by government interventions. At regional level, markets are poorly integrated; 
− increased demand for food grains and other agricultural commodities may lead to competition for 
land and water (‘land grabbing’); 
− bio3fuel utilization policies to address climate change problems may create alternative demand for 
food crops intensifying competition for land and water. 
 
An actual crisis is usually triggered by a combination of short term developments in demand and supply 
and/or policy changes. The combination of poor harvests and low stocks is generally an important direct 
cause of crises which may also serve as a warning signal. As Wiggins et al. (2010) state: ‘All spikes seen 
in the last 40 years have been associated with low stock3to3use ratio’s. Better information on stock levels 
and awareness of the dangers of low ratio’s may help’. 
Once a crisis starts, several policy and market reactions can aggravate the crisis, such as: 
− export bans to keep low domestic prices , reduction of import tariffs to maintain consumption and 
avoid social/political unrest; 
− re3stocking national reserves by government agencies in reaction to price increases and/or low 
stocks; 
− stocking or ‘hoarding’ by households and traders to hedge against or avoid absolute shortages. 
 
2.3 The 2007908 crisis 
In the case of the 2007/2008 Food Price Crisis there appears to be general agreement that is was 
triggered through the multiplicative effect of the combination of: 
− a series of poor harvests in exporting countries;  
− low global stocks as a result of poor harvests and market policy decisions; 
− a rather sudden increased demand for bio3fuel crops due to policies (e.g. US , EU); 
− general inflation and a fuel price crisis through rapid growth of the global economy and depreciation 
of US dollars leading to high cereal prices in dollars. 
 
However, there is an ongoing debate on the relative contributions of the various factors to the crisis in 
particular those on the demand side of the market and the possible effects of increased ‘speculative’ 
trading of food commodity derivates in financial markets. (Wiggins et al., 2010; Baffes & Haniotis, 2010). 
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2.4 Increased demand?  
The short3term effect of the increased demand in booming Asian economies was almost certainly minimal 
since China and India at the time hardly imported any rice and consumption in these countries did not 
grow suddenly. The estimated contribution of the increased demand for bio3fuel to the price hike varies 
from minimal to a (likely exaggerated) 75%. It is agreed that US ethanol production almost certainly 
contributed to the rise in the maize price, but much less or hardly to the prices of wheat and rice 
respectively. The increased demand for bio3fuel in the US had two policy drivers: In 2005 the US Energy 
Act set mandatory targets for bio3fuel production focused on bio3ethanol, while under the US policy and 
subsidy regime, ethanol distilled from grains become commercially feasible once the oil price rises over 
US$ 60370/barrel. The oil price rise from US$ 20 in 2001 to more than US$ 130 in 2008 resulted in a 
considerable demand. It is debated whether the US$ 60/barrel threshold will remain tenable or realistic on 
the long term. The long term demand for food crops for bio3fuel will depend on the development of prices 
of bio3fuel crops relative to price development of fossil fuels and alternative energy sources. 
2.5 Financial markets and speculation? 
Investments in futures markets by index funds have increased substantially in the past decade, this has 
been termed the ‘financialization of commodity futures markets’. The large size of these investments 
(some 100 billion US$) has led to a heated discussion about the role of index funds and speculators in 
general in commodity futures markets. Several papers that appeared state that this influx has led to a 
bubble in commodity futures prices (de Schutter, 2009; Robles,Torero & von Braun, 2009; Baffes & 
Haniotis, 2009). The role of commodity futures markets in reducing price risk and in price discovery has 
thus been questioned. The arguments seem intuitively obvious, but a number of scientific publications 
have refuted the bubble theory by econometric studies, pointing out both logical inconsistencies in the 
arguments made and pointing out contradictory facts. A recent review of the relevant scientific studies is 
given by Irwin and Sanders (2010).  
Based on the belief that speculative trading in food3commodity futures and derivatives leads to increased 
volatility and food price hikes, IFPRI and De Schutter advocate measures to intervene and/or regulate in 
‘virtual’ commodity markets including the use of physical and ‘virtual’ food grain reserves. Their proposals 
are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
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3 Food grain reserves (levels, functions, 
disadvantages) 
 
Keeping reserve stocks of staple foods is about as old as mankind and food reserves have always been 
an instrument in ‘food security policies’ by rulers and governments. ‘Strategic food reserves’ were already 
kept in biblical Egypt, in China and in the Roman Empire which maintained its peace by ‘bread and games’ 
for the people.  
A review of the history of (strategic) food reserves in the context of food security policy making (Shaw, 
2007 ; Murphy, 2009) shows that attention for food reserves is strongest in times of crisis caused by 
shortages or oversupply leading to low producer prices and farmer incomes. Reserves have been and are 
being used for a variety and often combinations of policy objectives such as price control, emergency 
preparedness, export buffer, up to ‘buying’ political goodwill.  
Food grain reserves may be kept at different levels. In less developed market situations, stocks are often 
kept at household or ‘village’ level or by (small) traders and processors to safeguard supply levels over the 
season. In more advanced economies private sector companies maintain ‘working’ or ‘pipeline’ stocks 
which may be considerable.2 
‘Strategic’ food grain reserves are held by the public sector. While the option of holding or controlling 
stocks internationally has been discussed since the 1950s, this has never been implemented. At national 
level, a large number of African countries maintain food reserve systems and regional coordination is 
being developed. In various Asian countries including China, large national reserves are maintained. In the 
South East Asian region, regional coordination between national reserves is being piloted. National food 
reserves are also held in some Latin American countries but at lower levels.  
There are two main functions or objectives of public held food grain reserves: 
− price stabilization and/or price control. Through buying (at harvest) and later releasing stocks, 
market prices can be stabilized throughout production seasons within a price3band with maximum 
and minimum price levels. In many countries governments have used National Food Reserves to 
maintain fixed prices throughout the country with the objective to ensure food availability throughout 
the country, often with a focus on urban consumers/voters. This is only possible through operating 
(para3)statal organisations like Marketing Boards or National Food Security Agencies with 
monopolistic powers; 
− emergency response Food reserves at all levels can serve to meet emergencies in food supply.  
 
In addition, food grain reserves may contribute to long3term food security through: 
− stimulating agricultural production. The basic market failure of in3elastic food markets can be 
corrected by buying and stocking if prices are low, thus supporting production levels and ensuring 
farmer income. However, the reverse action, discouraging overproduction through release of stocks, 
generally does not work since farmers will tend to produce more to maintain their income level when 
prices are low; 
 
                                                 
2
 In grain producing and exporting countries (temporary) export bans may lead to ‘reserve stocks’ held by the private sector in excess 
of normal pipeline stocks. 
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− complement or replace private sector capacities. In countries where the private sector 
operators (traders and processors) lack capital and expertise to invest in and maintain proper 
‘working’ stock positions and where storage, transport and processing infrastructure is poorly 
developed, public storage and handling capacity can play an important role in facilitating further 
market development.  
 
Since the essential function of strategic food grain reserves is buffering against short3term developments 
and crises in food markets and/or emergencies, they are only of limited value in addressing the long3term 
developments in global food security outlined above. As Sophia Murphy (2009) states: ‘a grain reserve 
cannot solve chronic hunger, although it can be used to improve market function and in that sense reduce 
poverty and vulnerability to hunger’. Besides immediate emergency response, food grain reserves thus 
may be helpful in avoiding crises and addressing volatility of prices in food markets.  
While food reserves can be a valuable food security tool, maintaining and operating public held reserves 
also has important disadvantages:  
− reserves are costly both in investment cost and maintenance. Although efficient buying and selling 
policies may allow recovering some of the cost, they remain a recurring expense on the national 
budget (whether as a national operation or as a contribution to a regional or global programme); 
− reserves are designed to intervene where markets fail or are unstable. Thus while reserves may 
complement and stabilize private sector market development, too large a role in trade volumes and 
in price control (e.g. by fixed price setting rather than using a price band approach) may lead to 
market distortion stifling normal market functioning and private sector initiatives;  
− in order to react timely and effectively, management of reserves need to have accurate and early 
information on expected developments in production and demand. This requires early warning 
systems and monitoring systems which are again costly and difficult to operate. Even when good 
information is available, management of reserves involves a large element of guesswork; 
− operating reserves requires transparent, professional and accountable management. To effectively 
fulfil the role of stabilizing and complementing normal private sector food markets, the management 
of reserves should be ‘at arm’s length’ of both political and/or government influences as well as 
private sector operators. Their position should be similar to that of the management of a Central 
Bank (Byerlee et al., 2006). Lack of transparency and trust between the public and private sector 
may actually lead to increased prices and volatility due to unanticipated interventions; 
− in order to effectively operate, marketing boards need to interact in world and regional markets. To 
arrest domestic food price hikes they need access to imports (FAO, 2010). However, the private 
sector competition in these markets is often better informed and financed and political powerful ( e.g 
large companies). 
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4 Past experiences 
 
Government policy making involving food reserve stocks in a ‘modern’ sense started around the end of the 
19th century when the ‘agricultural revolution’ in the USA and elsewhere led to large food grain surpluses 
and consequently to low farming incomes. Government intervened to protect farm incomes and built up 
reserves. These were used to provide food3aid to countries in need, especially just after the 1st World War. 
Thus the combination of market interventions and (emergency) food3aid developed.  
Between the World Wars most (colonial) governments intervened in food markets. Exporting countries 
actively supported and protected farm income through marketing boards, importing countries protected 
their own farming through quota’s, import regulations and bilateral preferential trade agreements.  
In the aftermath of the 2nd World War in the late 1940s and 1950s the issue of ‘freedom from want’ 
(President Roosevelt) and the question of how a world food reserve might contribute to food security and 
peace became an important issue in international policy. Discussions under the auspices of FAO and the 
World Bank focused on the possibilities of a food reserve at the international level. With the establishment 
of UNCTAD in 1964 the question of how to manage agricultural markets became a second major point of 
attention. The discussions generated a series of interesting ideas and proposals to manage food security, 
but implementation of international controlled stocks did not follow. Political agreement on purpose and 
implementation strategy could not be reached. 
Interest in operating Strategic Food Reserves renewed when the food shortages of the early 1970s hit. An 
international grain reserves system in the form of a collective of national reserves was proposed. But 
again political agreement could not be reached. In practice, the global action focused on reserves to meet 
emergency shortages, and countries were encouraged to develop national food stocks as a safeguard 
against poor harvests. 
While internationally held or coordinated food grain reserves never really came off the ground, the 
international collaboration in the field of early warning and market information has been quite successful. 
Since the 1950s a system of regular reporting of commodity market information for its statistical 
publications was operated by member governments. In 1968 an early warning system for food shortages 
was established by FAO and WFP (World Food Programme). Over the years, this system was improved and 
expanded. Presently, the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning and Information System (GIEWS) 
operates an network of data collection and information sharing with national and international agencies. It 
monitors world food supply/demand and provides the international community with prompt information on 
crop prospects and the food security situation on a global, regional and country3by3country basis. In case 
of impending food emergencies, the system dispatches rapid crop and food supply assessment missions, 
often jointly with the WFP. Using modern information technologies, GIEWS has developed the GIEWS 
Workstation, which gives access to geographic and statistical data, country food situation updates, and 
early warning messages. GIEWS Workstation also facilitates data sharing among national and international 
institutions for early warning and other food security related purposes.  
Prompted by the 1984385 famines in Africa, the United States created the Famine Early Warning System 
(FEWS) to anticipate possible pending famines and advise policymakers on how such famines might be 
prevented and their effects mitigated. When the programme started to assist in 2000 in creating and 
strengthening of local food security information systems and famine warning and response planning 
systems within Africa , the name was changed to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET).  
 Strategic Food Grain Reserves 
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The information used by GIEWS and FEWS NET originates mainly from international and national public 
sector sources and statistics. Trading and stock positions held by (large) private sector operators are so 
far not monitored.  
4.1 Sub Sahara Africa 
Upon independence most African countries had inherited national marketing boards with monopolistic 
powers in agricultural markets including control of imports, domestic farmer and consumer price control, 
distribution and storage of staple foods. In this context of heavily managed agriculture, National Food 
Reserves were created to respond to food emergencies.  
When the Sahel suffered a widespread and severe drought in the early 1970s, the region needed to 
import grain with world prices that were at record high levels in global grain markets because increased 
demand coincided with low stock levels in exporting countries (e.g. USA). Governments of developing 
countries concluded that world markets were not a sufficiently secure source in an emergency and 
security stocks were established in several countries in sub3Saharan Africa between 1975 and 1980, 
including Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
These national food reserve systems have been criticized as costly, inefficient and impeding the 
development of domestic markets. However, the problems the national systems faced were not all similar 
and some systems functioned much better than others. Some governments used the reserves to keep 
grain prices as low as possible for urban consumers, at the expense of farmer income and investments in 
agriculture. Management of reserves proved difficult and was plagued by corruption and bureaucracy. In 
the course of the 1980s and 90s the high costs of maintaining and operating reserves for emergency 
response and price control could no longer be supported by governments, and under IMF/World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programmes the role of food reserves changed. While agreeing that market 
liberalization was needed to allow domestic markets to develop, many countries have been reluctant to 
give up completely the price stabilization objective. However, policies have been changed to emphasize 
food security in emergency situations while allowing sustainable market development. 
In the Sahel region there has been a gradual development of integrated food security systems consisting 
of three components: (i) early warning and food information, (ii) coordination with food3aid donors and (iii) 
safety net interventions. In 1990 CILSS/Club du Sahel agreed to integrate food3aid interventions into long3
term agricultural and rural development plans. In recent years (FAO NEPAD, 2004) physical reserves are 
still maintained in many countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) but at much reduced 
levels and reserved for emergency relief with maximum stocks of 3 months of anticipated import 
requirements in a poor harvest year. Most national food reserve systems also include a financial 
component (food reserve fund) to allow emergency imports.  
4.1.1 The Mali model 
The system that was put in place in Mali in 1981 is seen as one of the best models for national food 
security reserves. The Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréalier (PRMC) is considered an 
effective model for coordination between government and donor partners and combines information, 
financial tools and physical reserves in six elements: 
1. an early warning system; 
2. a market information system; 
3. a national security stock of 35,000 tonnes; 
4. an emergency intervention unit; 
5. a joint counterpart fund; 
6. a food security fund. 
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4.1.2 The Ethiopia model 
The countries in the Horn of Africa experienced recurring drought, conflict and war leading to loss of 
agricultural production and severe food emergencies. The region is heavily reliant on food3aid. Ethiopia 
established in 1982 the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR) which is managed by an autonomous 
administration (the EFSRA) since 1991.3 The maximum stock level is maintained at 407,000 tonnes.(FAO 
NEPAD, 2004) The initial stock and investments as well as training were donor funded. Stocks are 
released to distribution agents in a national donor funded safety net programme and borrowers restock 
when their supplies arrive. There is an early warning system with local antennae. The Ethiopian 
Government carries the cost of management and maintenance. The model is followed in Niger, Malawi and 
Mauritania.  
Elsewhere in Eastern Africa, Kenya attempted to continue maintaining a fixed price policy with limits on 
private trade. This has discouraged market development, and brought a parallel market into existence 
which cost a great deal of public money. In contrast, Uganda has traditionally held no stocks and has 
encouraged private market development.  
In Southern Africa in the 1980s390s some governments let their (para3) statal marketing boards hold 
reserve stocks for emergencies and food3aid, while at the same time competing in the open markets (e.g. 
ADMARC in Malawi). Others, such as Tanzania and Zambia, created special units to manage emergency 
reserves. Zimbabwe has attempted to keep a combination of physical stocks and financial reserves. 
However, reserves were not (directly) linked to safety net programmes like in the Sahel and governments 
in southern Africa continued to intervene in grain markets , often politically motivated, thus discouraging 
structural development of private trade. Since the early 2000s, WFP in Mozambique has prepositioned 
food3aid reserves in strategic locations and Mozambique does currently not hold other reserves. 
In reaction to food shortages in various African countries in the early 2000s (e.g. Malawi ) and the 20073
08 food price crises, new initiatives aimed at improving food security and market functioning are being 
developed as a complement to emergency food reserves. Instruments to improve market functioning 
include (FAO NEPAD, 2004): 
− use of trade insurance to remove credit constraints in regional trade; 
− use of warehouse receipts to cover credit requirements in the chain; (e.g. Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Zambia and the East African Grain Council); 
− Commodity Exchanges to manage the risk of increased price volatility associated with market 
liberalization (e.g. South Africa); 
− market information systems; 
− donor financing of local purchases (e.g. the Purchase for Progress or P4P programme of WFP). 
During the March 2004 FAO 23rd Regional Conference for Africa (FAO NEPAD, 2004) on the NEPAD 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the establishment of regional food 
security reserves systems was discussed. Policy recommendations included: 
− development of integrated national food security systems combining minimum physical reserves with 
well3defined and managed food safety3net programmes; 
− establishment of regional food security networks within natural trading areas. National reserves 
would be part of such networks; 
− encouragement of cross3border trade; 
− maximization of reliance on local production for local markets and safety3net programmes. 
                                                 
3 http://www.dppc.gov.et/pages/about3.htm 
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In June 2004, a combined NEPAD/WFP study explored further options for regional food security systems. 
In 2006, the establishment of regional collaboration was endorsed by African governments. In response, 
various regional initiatives have been proposed.  
For the Sahel region the CILSS since 2007 has facilitated the initiative to establish RESOGEST4, a 
coordinating unit which is to ensure the availability of a regional emergency stock made up by reserving 
5% of the national stocks of the participating countries, improve management capacities at national level, 
facilitate cross3border exchanges and provide information on public, private sector and farmer’s stocks 
and information on tenders and prices. RESOGEST has not been implemented yet. 
In the SADC region5 a framework for a SADC Regional Food Reserve Facility is being developed but 
progress appears to be slow. Current proposals for the implementation of this regional mechanism are 
based on the establishment of a physical stock, a financial instrument, and an insurance against risks in 
support of farmers. Such a facility would benefit from and collaborate with the existing SADC Food 
Security Early Warning System. 
4.2 The Asian region 
The situation in the Asian region differs in many respects from Africa. Rice is the major staple in the region 
and is produced and traded in vast quantities all over the region. Domestic and regional markets and 
infrastructure are generally much better developed. As an IFPRI study from 2005 stated (Rashid et al. 
2005):  
‘Our results suggest that conditions in the region have improved significantly over the past thirty years; and none 
of the four commonly agreed rationales3that is, poorly integrated domestic markets, thin and volatile world 
market, promoting modern technology and the scarcity of foreign exchange reserves3for public intervention in 
food3grain markets are now persuasive. Domestic food3grain markets are integrated, international markets for 
both wheat and rice are significantly more robust than they were thirty years ago..’ 
Nevertheless, most large countries in South East Asia maintain national stocks for price stabilisation and 
(partly) for emergency response. In Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, these are managed by 
private entities or state owned enterprises, while in China, Japan, and Brunei, stocks are directly 
controlled and managed by the government. Stock levels vary but are generally large. According to the 
Indonesian state enterprise BULOG the rice reserve stock in Indonesia is at about 350,000 tons, China 
reaches 34 million tons, Thailand two million tons, Vietnam one million tons, Japan one million tons, South 
Korea 1,1 million tons and the Philippines 750 thousand tons6. With a share of 90% of the global rice 
production of about 430 million tons produced and consumed in the region, these stocks are relatively 
limited and are to be regarded partially as ‘pipeline’ stocks rather than pure ‘strategic’ reserves.  
 
                                                 
4 Réseau des Societés, Commissariats, Offices Charges de la Gestion des Stocks de Securité Alimentaire au Sahel et en ‘l Afrique de ‘l 
Ouest  
5 Southern African Development Community 
6 http://www.bulog.co.id/eng/history_v2.php 
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In India, the government and parastatals also play a major role in domestic markets and India maintains 
large reserve stocks of rice7 and wheat. In Pakistan, PASSCO8 was expected to have an surplus stock of 
3 MMT of wheat in early 2010. After the 2007308 food price crisis and in reaction to fears of new crises, 
governments and agencies appear to be stocking at higher levels (e.g. the NFA in Philippines end 2009 
planned to stock up to some 334 million tons of rice to avoid importation in 2010). 
There are two emergency reserve systems operational in Asia, the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve 
(EAERR) in the ASEAN region and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Food 
Security Reserve 
4.2.1 East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR)  
In 1979 the ASEAN countries agreed to establish a common rice reserve to meet emergency 
requirements from natural disasters and man3made calamities: the ASEAN Emergency Rice 
Reserve(AERR). During its more than 27 years of existence, the stock level never exceeded 87,000 tons, 
not even sufficient to meet a half3day ration for the rice3consuming populations of the ten ASEAN member 
countries and the AERR thus never really became operational. In 2003 the East Asia Emergency Rice 
Reserve started as a three year pilot. EAERR is a regional cooperation programme among the ten ASEAN 
Member States, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. (the ASEAN Plus 3). The objectives of the 
scheme are to provide food assistance and strengthen food security in emergencies caused by disasters, 
and for poverty alleviation purposes, but also aims to contribute to price stability of rice in the region. 
Under the scheme, the 13 participating countries pledge contributions and mutually share and exchange 
stocks. A management team operates a detailed mechanism on the release of its stocks and distribution. 
Apart from its objective of food security, it is also geared towards intra and inter3regional trade and in 
fostering competitiveness of member countries through technology transfer, regional cooperation and 
private3sector participation. Transportation and operational costs are borne by the country in receiving 
supplies. 
Since the EAERR not only aims at emergency response but also aims at fostering regional trade it appears 
to be specifically beneficial to Japan and Thailand. For Thailand, the reserve is a potential market for its 
rice exports. For Japan, the scheme is a way of safeguarding its domestic rice market because of its 
obligations to the World Trade Organization (WTO). While holding a large stock of imported rice in its 
market would adversely affect Japan’s rice farmers, the East Asia reserve enables Japan to have a supply 
of rice whenever domestic demand rises while still complying with its WTO commitment. 
In 2010 the EAERR was changed to the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) The new scheme is 
based on the principle of voluntary contribution by member countries to two types of reserves: the 
‘allocated’ physical stock for which a certain quantity of rice is reserved in national stock for a specific 
need, and another ‘stored’ stock in kind or in the form of funds. 
4.2.2 SAARC Food Bank 
In 1988, a regional emergency reserve scheme was established by the SAARC9 member countries: 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Being the modelled after the first 
ASEAN scheme, it met the same problems.  
                                                 
7 In July 2010 India stocked 24,3 MMT of rice while the buffer norm is 9,8 MMT (Bloomberg)  
8 Pakistan Agriculture Storage and Services Corporation 
9 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
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In 2007 by the SAARC countries agreed to establish the SAARC Food Bank (SFB) The objectives of the 
scheme expanded beyond emergencies to act not only as a regional food security reserve for member 
countries during emergencies, but also to provide regional support to national food security efforts, foster 
regional integration and solve regional food shortages through collective action. The stocks under the 
Bank are held in the member countries and decisions on release are taken by a board. Releases by the 
Bank are to be restocked in kind by the receiving country. The SFB Board is to periodically review prices 
according to agreed principles. The SFB is not yet fully operational and has not yet been able to reserve 
adequate food grains to ensure regional food security. At present, around 243,000 tons of food grains 33 
153,000 tons in India, 40,000 tons each in Bangladesh and Pakistan, 4,000 tons each in Nepal and Sri 
Lanka, 1,200 tons in Afghanistan, 200 tons in Bhutan and 180 tons in Maldives 33 are available with the 
SFB. In October 2010 it was proposed to increase the strategic reserves to 400,000 tons, which may 
later be increased to one million tons. Implementation will involve the construction of new food 
warehouses in member countries, local procurement and international purchase of additional food grains 
and also the development of an administrative and distribution network. 
4.3 The Latin America & Caribbean region 
Similar to the situation in Africa, in South America and the Caribbean, government involvement in food3
grain markets has been reduced under World Bank/IMF structural adjustment policies and market 
liberalisation agreements (e.g. NAFTA). Government controlled stocks have been reduced and privatised.  
Most countries in Central America and the Caribbean are net importers of food grain with imports making 
up 30% of the total supply. Market liberalisation and deregulation of agriculture in these countries has had 
severe consequences for the position of local agriculture and food production. According to Olson from 
IATP (Olson 2008): 
‘A few transnational agribusinesses, like U.S.3based Cargill and Mexican3based (but partly U.S.3owned) corn giant 
Maseca, now exercise unprecedented market control over key agricultural sectors, including yellow and white 
corn and beans. This means that whenever prices rise for these commodities in the Mexican market, Cargill can 
stop buying in the Mexican market and turn to their own imported reserves. By doing so, they are able to 
undermine producer prices for Mexican farmers and push them out of their own market….’ 
The larger grain producing countries in Southern America are probably less affected since domestic 
markets do not depend on imports. 
4.3.1 Latin America & Caribbean Emergency Response (LACERN) 
The only regional food reserve programme directed at emergency response is the LACERN a co3operation 
between the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean and WFP The LACERN network, established 
in 2005, has the logistical capacity of both storage and delivery of food rations and emergency 
equipment, as well as warning systems. Specifically, three regional stocks supplied by the host states 
(Ecuador, Barbados and El Salvador) allow pre3positioning of high3energy biscuits for countries affected by 
disasters. Each depot operates on the basis of an initial stock of 150 tons of biscuits, systematically and 
immediately refilled after each distribution. 
4.4 The World Food Programme (WFP) 
The WFP plays a central role in emergency response as well as in longer term food security programmes 
all over the world. As such it is a major player in world, regional and domestic markets. While WFP has a 
large ‘annual turnover’ in food, it does not keep large physical stocks. For storage of commodities WFP 
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relies on commercial channels and government agencies. In many countries WFP has arrangements which 
allows drawing on national or regional reserves (e.g. the Ethiopia model)10. 
In the first period of its existence WFP relied for its food3aid deliveries mainly on in3kind donations from 
surplus stocks of donor countries. The 1973 global food shortages led to a gradual change from in3kind to 
financial contributions and WFP has become a major purchaser of food. The Netherlands has strongly 
supported this policy development. 
In 1975 the UN General Assembly established the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), to be 
placed at the disposal of WFP. This reserve is the only international facility available to respond to food 
emergencies. It receives contributions from  governments and has a minimum annual target of 500,000 
tons. It is a voluntary facility to provide emergency relief from food stocks and budgeted funds kept in 
donor countries. It includes an Immediate Response Account (IRA), a cash reserve to purchase food to 
respond to emergency food needs quickly. Country offices can borrow up to US$ 500,000 from the IRA in 
case of emergencies. The IEFR has not fully lived up to its original expectations. It is not like a bank 
account ready for WFP to use, nor is it a physical stock of food kept by WFP to be used directly in 
emergency response. In addition, a high proportion of the contributions are tied to specific commodities, 
and contributions have been announced after emergencies occurred and have fluctuated considerably. 
In 2004, the WFP Board approved a pilot US$180 million Working Capital Financing Facility, which allows 
advances to operations to procure food before a contribution to a project had been confirmed by donors. 
In 2008, US$60 million from the Working Capital Financing Facility was used for a pilot Forward Purchase 
Facility to enable WFP to buy food based on estimated aggregated regional needs and funding forecasts 
to further reduce lead times for the delivery of food. It has been successful in achieving both time and 
cost savings and it reduces the need for large in3country stocks. In November 2010 the WFP Board was 
asked to approve the increase of the Working Capital Financing Facility ceiling to US$557 million to enable 
the Executive Director to provide advance financing to operations including the Forward Purchase Facility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 For direct response to emergencies and disasters, the logistics operations of WFP manage the network of United Nations 
Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) which is able to deliver humanitarian relief items worldwide within 24/48 hrs . The 
Network provides storage, logistics support and services to UN humanitarian agencies, international humanitarian organizations, 
governmental and non3governmental organizations. The network so far consists of 5 depots in different regions: Europe (Brindisi / 
Italy), Africa (Accra / Ghana) , Middle East (Dubai / UAE) , South East Asia (Subang / Malaysia) and Latin America (Panama City / 
Panama). These depots are primarily stocking non3food items but also keep limited stocks (e.g. 100 tons) of food commodities 
specifically Oils and Fats and High Energy Biscuits. 
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5 The importance of context 
 
The review in the previous sections shows that food grain reserves have been and are being used in 
different forms usually in combination with a variety of other instruments depending on the specific policy 
objectives and local, regional or international context. The question whether (re3) establishment and 
operation should be supported thus depends on purpose and context. 
The present policy debate on the role of food grain reserves focuses on their contribution to three goals: 
− further improvement of emergency response through developing an internationally coordinated 
system of limited physical reserves that would fit in local and regional food security policies and 
programmes; 
− stabilization and further development and integration of domestic and regional markets to 
stimulate increased public and private investments in development of agricultural production; 
− addressing price volatility in the world food market. 
 
The proposals by IFPRI (Braun and Torero, 2009) in collaboration with Justin Lin, senior vice president and 
chief economist at the World Bank, have played a central role in the policy discussion. Their paper 
proposes three global collective actions to address the key issues above: 
− a modest independent emergency reserve to be supplied and funded by a group consisting of 
the main grain3producing countries (the Club11) and managed by WFP. The reserve would consist of a 
physical stock of 300,000 – 500,000 MT of basic grains (= 5% of current food3aid flows) held 
decentralized in national storage facilities and used solely for emergency response and humanitarian 
programmes. The reserve would be managed by the WFP, which would have access to the grain at 
pre3crisis market prices to reduce the need for short3term ad hoc fundraising (von Braun et al., 
2009). 
− an international coordinated global food reserve held under an agreement under UN Auspices 
by the members of the Club and controlled by a high3level technical commission appointed by the 
Club. Reserve stocks would be held by participating countries in addition to the private sector 
commercial ‘pipeline’ stocks. The stock held by each country would correspond to a percentage of 
its annual domestic demand. These reserves would be drawn upon by the high3level technical 
commission only when needed for intervention in the spot market. 
− a ‘virtual reserve’ which would be a coordinated commitment by the Club members to supply funds 
to intervene in the international food3commodity futures market. The high3level technical commission 
would intervene in case of feared excessive price development by ‘short’ selling in the futures market 
to move speculators out of the market and return prices to reflect market fundamentals. The fund 
would (provisionally) be expected to be 12320 billion US$ being some 30350% of normal grain trade 
volume in the world market. 
 
A second key participant in the debate is the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). In various 
publications Sophia Murphy and others argue that development of trade and operating food grain reserves 
are to be regarded as complementary rather than contradictory strategies. IATP puts emphasis on 
collaboration between governments and private sector operators and their organisations and the role of 
existing local, national and regional food grain reserves in the development of food markets.  
 
                                                 
11 members of the G8+5 plus major grain exporters such as Argentina, Thailand, and Vietnam 
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IATP proposes (Murphy 2009, 2010): 
− increase foreign and domestic investment to achieve culturally appropriate local and regional 
food security reserves;  
− lead efforts to establish an international commission on reserves, which could be coordinated 
by the FAO Committee on Food Security, to make recommendations on the establishment of a 
coordinated global food reserve system;  
− support multilateral, regional and bilateral trade rules that allow developing countries to invest 
in the production and infrastructure necessary to support food reserves;  
− renegotiate the Food Aid Convention to ensure that contributions towards food security reserves 
are eligible to be counted towards meeting commitments under the convention. 
So while IFPRI emphasizes internationally coordinated/controlled reserves for emergency and price 
stabilization in predominantly the world market, IATP(and others) 12 see a more important role for regional 
collaboration, improvement of local private markets and adaptations in international and local market 
regulation. In their view, the existing national reserves should be limited to a supportive role and fit into 
food3safety net and market development programmes. 
The recent publications offer important criteria that should be met to allow effective functioning of food 
reserves for each of the three purposes outlined above. 
5.1 Reserves for emergency response 
When considering food reserves in the context of the need for effective emergency response, it is clear 
that such reserves:  
− are needed on short3term;  
− needed locally; 
− require specific foods fit for the specific situation and population concerned. 
Therefore emergency reserves should be decentralised and limited in size but large enough to allow time 
(133 months) for further imports if needed. (FAO NEPAD, 2004). Preferably they should be combined with 
earmarked financial reserves for purchase of additional supplies if needed; this will reduce the cost of 
maintaining physical stocks and allow flexibility of purchase and logistics (Murphy, 2009 ; FAO Easypol, 
2010). 
Furthermore, while emergency and food3aid reserves may be physically combined with reserves aimed at 
market stabilisation, a clear distinction between both purposes should be maintained and translated 
management and administrative rules.  
Emergency reserves should be an integral element of comprehensive food security safety3net 
programmes, combining such elements as early warning and market information systems, monitoring of 
farm level and private stock positions etc. The globally operating Early Warning Systems operated by 
FAO/WFP and FEWS NET are of great value and can support local systems. 
Operating emergency reserves should aim at stimulating development and integration of domestic and 
regional markets and not replace private sector investments but complement these. Consequently re3
stocking of reserves should preferably be by local /regional purchasing.  
                                                 
12
 Amongst others. Share the World’s Resources, ODI, The UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food and FAO 
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In this respect the development of the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme13 of the WFP which aims 
specifically at purchasing food3aid commodities from smaller local producers and processors rather than 
tendering on international markets provides a good example of utilizing food3aid funds as investment in 
local agricultural production and market development.  
The Mali and Ethiopia models described in Section 4, which primarily aim at emergency response and 
humanitarian programmes, already to a large extent meet these criteria. The RESOGEST and SADC 
Regional Food Reserve Facility initiatives aim to add the dimension of regional coordination and 
integration.  
The independent emergency reserve as proposed by IFPRI differs in two aspects from the present 
situation of national schemes and efforts to achieve regional coordination. IFPRI puts emphasis on 
independent coordination by WFP and proposes funding by the main grain producing countries (the Club). 
This would offer the opportunity of improving regional coordination and limit the risk of each country trying 
to protect its food supply by uncoordinated imports in times of scarcity, leading to increased volatility in 
already thin markets. In practice, WFP often already plays an important coordinating role in meeting 
emergencies. However, assigning a central role to WFP would require reaching broad agreement with the 
countries involved in each of the regional schemes which would have to surrender part of their authority to 
WFP. 
The proposed expanded Forward Purchase Facility operated by WFP could be an important instrument to 
complement the financial tools available for (re3)stocking regional emergency response reserves. 
While negotiating agreement on international coordination and funding may not be easy, it may be 
concluded that maintaining limited emergency stocks based on existing national reserves would contribute 
to global emergency response efficiency and food security. 
5.2 Reserves for Price stabilization and development of 
national and regional markets 
In domestic markets, price shocks can have serious negative consequences for long3term development of 
agriculture and food security, especially for the poor. Domestic price instability tends to be highest in 
Africa especially in land3locked countries that are close to self3sufficiency in a major staple. Low income 
countries with large populations and depending on imports are more susceptible to world market price 
variations (Byerlee et al. 2006).  
In many developing countries, government or parastatal agencies controlling national grain reserves still 
play an important role in food security and domestic food markets. However, in line with market 
liberalisation and structural adjustment policies their role has changed considerably. Their monopolist 
position in trade has been abandoned and fixed price policies have been replaced by price3band policies 
and/or interventions targeted at vulnerable groups. The total volume of reserves held also was reduced 
considerably. 
Many developing countries, especially smaller land3locked countries in Sub Sahara Africa, still suffer from 
poorly developed food markets. The intended take3over by the private sector has often led to short3term 
profit oriented trading practices, while market infrastructure and professional expertise of the state owned 
marketing organisations was neglected and often lost.  
                                                 
13 http://www.wfp.org/purchase3progress/overview 
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When the food price crisis of 2007308 hit, government actions in several countries have shown 
protectionist reflexes. In the ensuing policy debate there is general agreement that agencies holding 
national reserves still can have a role to play in food security. Their role should be primarily focused on: 
− stimulating the development of agriculture which is often still dominated by large numbers of small 
(semi3subsistence) farmers; 
− operating early warning systems and provision of market information (prices, demand, supply, 
stocks); 
− complement private sector shortcomings and facilitate private sector development in logistics, 
storage and processing. An important tool to support private sector functioning directly related to 
stock keeping is the use of a Warehouse Receipts system under which farmers, traders and 
processors can obtain credit for storage costs. The use of Warehouse Receipts also offers the 
opportunities to monitor stocks held by the private sector.  
Various publications (FAO NEPAD, 2004 ; Byerlee et al. 2006 ; FAO Easypol, 2010 ; Murphy, 2009 ; FAO 
CFS, 2010) offer criteria to be met in structuring and management of national reserves aimed at price 
stabilization: 
− reserves for price stabilization should be limited in size, large enough to meet emergency demands 
(336 months of requirements) but avoid a dominant position in the market; 
− its management should have a Central Bank type of autonomy, independent from political influences 
and within a framework of clear and well defined policies; 
− flexibility to hold combinations of physical stocks and financial reserves because this minimises costs 
and is in particular relevant for countries that have easy access to imports; 
− clear, transparent and predictable rules for market intervention. Unexpected interventions create 
uncertainty and mistrust impeding private sector investments and often leading to increased 
volatility; 
− price interventions should be price3band type and aim to maintain private sector competition. 
Preferably, interventions should be targeted to specific vulnerable groups;  
− while under normal circumstances reserves should ideally rely on local production, in order to be 
effective, national reserves should have access to imports. 
FAO (FAO NEPAD 2004) and others have emphasized the need for regional coordination of national 
reserve programmes and the need for integration of regional markets. The rationale behind this is that the 
world grain market covers only about 15% of total production and consumption and that most staple food 
is produced and consumed locally and are often region specific. However, cross border trade and 
exchanges so far meet many barriers. The recent initiatives in the sphere of coordinating and sharing 
emergency reserves like RESOGEST and the SADC Regional Food Reserve Facility both partially aim at 
improving regional trade conditions.  
The discussion paper for the FAO Committee on World Food Security (CFS) meeting in Rome in October 
2010 (FAO CFS 2010) noted the risks and possible costs of operating national reserves in developing 
countries and concluded that national reserves are not necessary in countries/regions with well3developed 
national markets (including futures markets ). The CFS is also rather sceptical regarding the possibilities to 
stabilize prices at regional level through internationally held/managed food reserves. According to the 
paper, the difficulties to agree on collective actions encountered in the EAERR and the SAARC SFB are 
likely to be even larger with more participants and higher stock levels.  
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However, the CFS paper saw possibilities for: 
− public sector held smaller strategic food reserves specifically targeting vulnerable groups, possibly 
in the form of a combination of physical stocks and reserved funds; 
− establishment of clear and transparent rules for market interventions by governments in terms of 
price3bands to enhance market functioning; 
− improvement of market information systems and better coordination between government and 
private sector the enhance the effectiveness of food reserve management.  
The CFS thus largely supports the position that regional coordinated national reserves should primarily aim 
at combining well designed emergency response with efforts to complement and stimulate development of 
private sector operated food markets, rather than aim at price stabilization. 
The IFPRI proposal for a system of international but decentralized held physical stocks to be used for 
intervention in the spot market(s) in times of price crises, in many respects resembles the current regional 
initiatives. However, this system would primarily aim at price stabilization and be coordinated by a an 
international technical committee and thus be further removed from the actual market stakeholders: 
governments, farmer organisations and private sector traders and processors.  
5.3 Reserves to curb price volatility in the World Market 
World grain trade constitutes only a small share of world production (from 7% for rice to 18% for wheat; 
FAOSTAT, 2010). Price variability in the world market at around 20330% tends to be higher than in 
domestic markets, reflecting transactions costs in transmitting international prices into domestic markets 
as well as policy interventions in domestic markets (Byerlee 2006). However, price fluctuations of many 
grains in African countries are usually higher than world price variability. World market prices influence 
domestic price levels and volatility through imports. With increasing urbanisation14 and possibly increasing 
demand for bio3fuel crops, the world market share of global production/consumption may increase further.  
The global trade is handled increasingly by only a handful of companies. Cargill, ADM and Bunge are the 
major players (Meijerink & Danse, 2009). In the grains market, and in food markets in general, there is a 
continuing trend towards horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration consists of merging 
firms at the same level in the supply chain while vertical integration consists of merging firms at different 
stages in the supply chain (for instance input and output sectors). The concentration of ‘market power’ in a 
few large multinational buyers against a multitude of relatively small producers characterizes an imperfect 
market and could lead to increased volatility  
The FAO (2009:122) has listed several factors that may cause a return to even higher food prices. 
Resumed income growth in developing countries after the financial crisis will lead to renewed expansion of 
demand for agricultural commodities. Secondly, higher real energy prices are linked to food prices 
through input and transportation costs on the one hand and increased demand for agricultural crops for 
biofuel production on the other hand. Thirdly, because of declining agricultural productivity growth , 
growing demand may not be met by growing supply, this adding pressure on prices. 
                                                 
14 Prof. Paul Collier in a WFP Interview : ‘Food prices have risen, some of the biggest food exporting countries have banned exports 
and we’re facing a relatively thin market on which a lot of poor, urban, coastal populations are dependent,’ he said. ‘They’re very 
exposed to this volatility in global market prices and that’s a relatively recent phenomenon. It’s only in the last couple of decades that 
you have coastal megacities emerging, with lots of poor people in them who spend typically half of their income on food, and are 
dependent on global market prices, because they’re fed from the world market rather than from the hinterland of their own countries.’ 
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5.4 An international coordinated global food reserve?  
During the food price crisis of 200632008, many (grains) importing countries faced difficulties in obtaining 
sufficient amounts at reasonable prices. One of the repercussions of this is that several countries have 
less confidence in the international grain markets and have reinstated grain self3sufficiency as a goal. IFPRI 
(von Braun et al., 2009) caution that this may result in an inefficient global production system with large 
total global reserves and a very thin and volatile global grain market. In a future food crisis, it will be even 
more difficult to import grain. The IFPRI proposal for an international coordinated global food reserve, aims 
at addressing these problems in the world market.  
The proposal has some features in common with the current security provisions of the International Energy 
Agency for dealing with disruptions of petroleum markets. Wright and Cafiero (2010) warn that a major 
challenge will be to ensure commitment by the participants themselves to honour their obligations and 
make their stocks available when markets are under stress. If exporters fail to commit, this can lead to 
turmoil in the global grain trade, as was the case in the food price crisis.  
The paper prepared for the FAO Committee on World Food Security (CFS) for their meeting in Rome in 
October 2010 (FAO CFS 2010) was rather sceptical about the possibility of stabilizing spot market prices 
through internationally controlled reserves. The paper states: 
‘51. In general, market regulation policies at national and international levels based on global or regional buffer 
stocks cannot prevent price spikes. In addition, with the exception of the most well3financed intervention 
activities, they may be unsuccessful in managing the market during a price surge. The experience with public 
buffer stocks suggests that, often, such interventions havebeen disruptive rather than stabilizing. Given the 
current state of knowledge about markets and previous experiences with collective action problems, it is not 
likely that such initiatives present practical solutions on a multilateral basis.’ 
 
In view of the arguments brought forward, and the fact that domestic food grain prices , although linked to 
world market prices, are primarily based on local and regional market fundamentals of supply and 
demand, it appears that restrained use of national reserves and combined with further improvement of 
domestic and regional market functioning , is to be preferred over the proposed international held 
reserves. 
5.5 Virtual Global Food Grain reserves and Regulation of 
Commodity Trading  
As mentioned in Section 2. there is an on3going debate concerning the role that increased trading in food3
commodity futures and derivates has on food grain prices in the world markets and indirectly in regional 
and domestic markets. Further research appears necessary to clarify the issue.  
Meanwhile IFPRI, believing that the large influx of index funds caused a bubble on the futures markets and 
pushed up food prices even more, propose a mechanism that would intervene in futures markets to bring 
the price down : A Virtual Reserve. Simply put, the mechanism would buy futures on a large scale at a 
lower price, which would force the futures price down.  
Irrespective of the outcome of the debate, it may be doubted if such a mechanism could operate 
successfully and have the intended effect of stabilizing prices. 
Part of the proposed mechanism is a Global Intelligence Unit (GIU) that would predict future prices on the 
basis of analysis. It is debatable whether this GIU can actually forecast prices correctly, which is not an 
easy task. Getting the estimates wrong would be a very costly mistake.  The GIU would set a price band 
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that would be used to determine whether prices are too high or too low. If the prices are ‘too high’ it is 
assumed that this is because of speculators. However, bubbles are very hard to detect, and most are 
discovered only after they have burst. 
IFPRI proposes that futures are sold ‘silently’ against a lower price. However, in practice, it will be very 
difficult to buy or sell futures unnoticed, especially at a large scale which is necessary for futures prices to 
decrease. Selling futures at a lower price is very costly and will lead to speculators making large profits. 
The idea comes down at ‘paying speculators to go away’. If high prices are not the result of a bubble, but 
the result of actual scarcity in the markets, the virtual fund is distorting markets and giving wrong price 
signals, which could have harmful effects. 
Again the FAO Committee on Food Security (FAO CFS 2010) has also been critical about the idea of a 
virtual reserve:  
‘any attempt to publicly influence the prices in futures markets might become extremely expensive and could 
lead to a withdrawal of the agents who use the futures markets for hedging purposes, thus rendering futures 
markets purely speculative’. 
The UN rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier de Schutter, (2010) also believes that ‘momentum based’ 
speculative trading of food commodity derivates as well as direct speculation in spot markets may lead to 
unwanted price hikes. He argues for ‘comprehensive reform of all derivates trading…’ in the financial 
markets. This would include measures aimed at transparency and limiting of positions such as registration 
of transactions, ‘clearing’ thresholds and limiting access to agricultural/food commodity markets to 
traders and investors with direct commercial interest. 
At an emergency intergovernmental meeting hosted by FAO in September 2010 it was agreed that 
‘insufficient market transparency and the impact of financialization on futures markets … were among the 
root causes of price volatility.  
Currently both the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission CFTC and the European Union15 are 
considering changes in regulations to make markets more transparent and curb the risks of unwanted 
speculative trading in food commodity derivates.(FAO CCP 2010). 
The EU DG Internal Market is planning to launch measures to regulate commodity exchanges and curb 
speculation, as well as step up transparency in food trade. The planned reform of the law, known as the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), and the envisaged review of the EU directive on market 
abuse will provide an opportunity for ‘an ambitious overhaul of the markets of raw materials’ (EurActiv, 
2010). 
In the US, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in collaboration with stakeholders is 
working out definitions and rules to implement Title VII of the Dodd3Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act(‘the Dodd3Frank Act’) which strives to regulate and clarify trading in the presently 
opaque physical and futures markets in agricultural commodities.  
In view of the fact that the influence of increased trading in food3commodity trading on spot market prices 
in global and domestic markets should be further clarified and the fact that the feasibility and effectiveness 
of operating a virtual reserve can be questioned, it may be concluded that supporting establishment of 
such a reserve is at least premature. Market regulation to increase transparency as currently proposed is 
probably more effective in reducing risks of price hikes.  
                                                 
15 http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=107771 
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5.6 The WTO and stockholding16 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) contains a number of restrictions relevant support (i.e. public 
spending) for public held food grain reserves held at national, regional and international levels. The focus 
of the Uruguay Round AoA (198631994) was on limiting the policy space that countries had to over3
produce with the help of protection and subsidies. The focus of the AoA rules on agriculture, and its 
continuation under the Doha Round, has been on addressing the problems of an era of cheap food. 
Therefore, a legitimate question is whether WTO agricultural rules, designed for an era of cheap food, are 
adequate to address also the opposite problem of expensive food and food crises.  
In the AoA there are two relevant provisions on stockholding and domestic food distribution provisions. 
These two are both placed under Green Box: i) public stockholding for food security purposes; and ii) 
domestic food aid. In general, domestic food aid programmes are WTO3compatible. Developing countries 
are permitted to implement governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes. This 
includes government programmes that acquire and release stocks of foodstuffs at administered prices for 
food security purposes. The condition placed in the AoA is that the difference between the acquisition 
price and the external reference price is accounted for in the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). 
Domestic food aid is defined by the AoA as the provision of foodstuffs at subsidised prices with the 
objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor in developing countries on a regular basis 
at reasonable prices. This is allowed under the AoA rules. 
5.7 The World Bank (WB) and stockholding 
Since the 2007/08 crises the WB has undertaken a number of actions to address food security problems.  
The Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) was set up in May 2008. This programme has a budget 
of US$ 2 billion up to June 2011 and is combined with an additional US$ 352 million in Trust Funds 
provided by various donors (including the EU Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility). The funds are used to 
address immediate needs, support safety net programmes ( e.g. food for work, school feeding, feeding of 
children and vulnerable groups). The funds are further used to meet additional expenses of food imports 
and to provide support for food production through supply of seeds and fertilizer and improving irrigation 
for small3scale farmers. 
The Agriculture Finance Support Facility was announced in June 2009 (with a US$ 20 million contribution 
by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). This facility will increase farmers’ access to savings, investments, 
credits and insurance.  
The WB further helps countries to develop financial market insurance products and risk management 
strategies to respond increases in prices of futures, such as weather derivates and crop insurance.  
In the debate on the causes of the food crisis, the WB cautions not to assign the crisis to any specific 
cause but emphasises the need for further development of agriculture and food production through 
investments in knowledge networks, research and development and programmes aimed at increased food 
production. With regard to response to crises, the Bank appears to be in support of the establishment of 
limited sized and decentralized WFP controlled emergency reserves. In order to limit price volatility in 
                                                 
16 This section is based on Sharma and Konandreas (2008). 
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world markets (spot and futures) Mr. Voegele17 emphasised the need for improved monitoring and 
inspections of both public and private sector held stocks.  
While Mr. Justin Lin, senior vice president and chief economist at the World Bank collaborated in the IFPRI 
proposals to establish physical and virtual reserves, the World Bank has so far not contributed financially 
to the (re3)establishment of reserve stocks aimed at price interventions in either spot or futures markets. 
 
 
                                                 
17 In a meeting with Mr Waalkens, (Member of Dutch Parliament) in November 2009.  
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6 Summary of conclusions and recommendations 
 
1. Food grain reserves may be kept at different levels: local, national, regional and global and stock 
keeping can serve a variety of policy aims. This paper concerns public held food grain reserves at 
national, regional and/or global level.  
2. Holding and operating ‘strategic’ reserves by the public sector (i.e governments, parastatals or 
international agencies) generally has two distinct but linked purposes: emergency response and price 
stabilisation in food markets.  
3. Since the essential function of strategic food grain reserves is always buffering against short3term 
developments and crises in food markets and/or emergencies, they are only of limited value in addressing 
the long3term developments in national or global food security such as the effects of climate change and 
changes in consumption patterns in upcoming economies. 
4. However, strategic food grain reserves may contribute to longer3term food security provided they are 
integrated in clear policies aimed at food security and/or development of agricultural production and 
private sector food markets. 
5. Whether used for emergency response or for price stabilisation or a combination of both, effective 
operation of strategic reserves requires (access to) comprehensive early warning and market information 
systems (e.g FAO/WFP , FEWS NET and local systems) , professional, transparent and accountable 
management and predictable intervention policies to avoid negative effects. The management of reserves 
should have an ‘Central Bank’ type autonomy with respect to government policy and political influences.  
6. While emergency and food3aid reserves may be physically combined with reserves aimed at market 
stabilisation, a clear distinction between both purposes should be maintained and translated in 
management and administrative rules. 
6.1 Reserves for emergency response 
 
7. There appears to be wide support for further improvement of emergency response and safety3net 
programmes including the establishment of emergency food grain reserves and financial reserves 
coordinated by the WFP. 
8. Emergency/food aid reserves should fit in integrated food security programmes and be linked to 
domestic and/or regional markets to stimulate the long3term development of such private sector operated 
markets. (e.g the WFP operated P4P programme).  
9. Emergency response reserves at national level should by preference be combined with financial 
reserves since this will reduce the cost of maintaining physical stocks and allow flexibility of purchase and 
logistics.  
10. An internationally WFP coordinated system of Emergency Response Reserves along the lines 
proposed by IFPRI, with stocks to the level of 300,000 – 500,000 mt based on existing national and/or 
regional reserve programmes, would contribute to global emergency response efficiency and food 
security. However, negotiating agreement on international coordination and funding may not be easy.  
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11. The proposed expanded Forward Purchase Facility operated by WFP could be an important instrument 
to complement the financial tools available for (re3)stocking regional emergency response reserves. 
12. Efforts to develop regional coordination of national food reserve programmes aimed primarily and 
emergency response and targeted humanitarian programmes (e.g. RESOGEST and SADC Regional Food 
Reserve Facility) deserve support. 
 
6.2 Reserves for price stabilisation 
 
13. Following the statement proposed for the October 2010 meeting of the FAO Committee on Food 
Security, it may be concluded that: ‘market regulation policies at national and international levels based on 
global or regional buffer stocks cannot prevent price spikes (…) The experience with public buffer stocks 
suggests that, often, such interventions have been disruptive rather than stabilizing. Given the current 
state of knowledge about markets and previous experiences with collective action problems, it is not likely 
that such initiatives present practical solutions on a multilateral basis.’  
14. In developed countries or regions with well3developed production and consumption value chains like 
the EU and North America, keeping reserve stocks for food security and/or price interventions should not 
be necessary. Price interventions and farmer subsidies in the EU and USA have a negative influence on 
development of food production and investments in agriculture in developing countries. The Dutch 
Government has a long term commitment to reduce such subsidies and to avoid interventions in the world 
food markets based on excess stocks. 
15. The role of reserves in price stabilisation in less developed domestic markets is probably limited. 
Intervening in markets with the use of reserves is often costly and demanding in terms of management 
(see also 5. above). 
16. The existing reserves held at national level in developing countries should be limited in size and avoid 
a dominant position in domestic markets. Preferably, interventions should be targeted at vulnerable 
groups, possibly in the form of a combination of physical stocks and reserved funds. 
17. National/regional reserves should only intervene in markets according to clear and transparent rules 
and in terms of price bands to enhance market functioning. 
18. Improvement of market information systems (including registration/monitoring of private sector held 
stocks) and transparent market regulation. 
19. Since domestic food grain prices, although linked to world market prices, are primarily based on local 
and regional market fundamentals of supply and demand, it appears that improved coordination and 
collaboration at regional level between existing national reserve programmes, combined with improved 
systems for market information and monitoring, is likely to be more effective and feasible than the IFPRI 
proposal for an international coordinated global food reserve controlled by a high3level technical 
commission of ‘The Club’. (see also 13. above). 
20. There is wide support for the view that ‘insufficient market transparency’ was among the root causes 
of price volatility. Improving market transparency through improvement of market information and 
introduction of registration and monitoring of public and private sector stock positions and transactions by 
an independent organisation, may be an effective option. The use of physical reserves to intervene in 
world markets, as proposed by IFPRI, is likely to be costly and probably less effective. 
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21. The influence of financialisation of commodity futures markets needs to be further clarified. This is why 
the establishment of a ‘virtual reserve’ to intervene in the futures markets as proposed by IFPRI is at least 
premature and possibly unwanted. Improved market regulation to make commodity futures markets more 
transparent and curb the risks of unwanted speculative trading in food commodity derivates as currently 
considered by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission CFTC (‘the Dodd3Frank Act’) and the 
European Union (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive MiFID) is likely to be more effective in 
reducing risks of price hikes. 
22. Current WTO rules permit developing countries to implement governmental stockholding programmes 
for food security purposes. In the Agenda on Agriculture, there are two relevant provisions, both placed 
under Green Box and relate to public stockholding for food security purposes (paragraph 3) and domestic 
food aid (paragraph 4), respectively. However, the WTO rules of government support to agricultural 
development were designed for an era of cheap food. In that era, the aim was to promote exports and 
discipline situations leading to depressed prices in world markets adversely affecting exports. Also, 
production subsidies and import barriers that lead to lower prices have been the target for reform, while 
policies that have to opposite effect, such as export taxes and prohibitions as well as consumption 
subsidies, have been largely tolerated. WTO rules and disciplines are therefore much less effective in 
situations of high world market price years than they are when they are low (Konandreas, 2010). 
Therefore, a legitimate question is whether the current rules, require adaptation to address the opposite 
problem of dear food and food crises. 
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Annex 1 
Some relevant key figures18 
 
 World 
production 
grains 2010 
World 
consumption 
grains 2010 
Global stocks 
End 2010 
Global stocks 
2009 
Global stocks 
2008 
Wheat 645 662 175 194 165 
Rice 460 454 97 95 90 
Corn3maize 831 830 139 139 147 
Total 1936 1946 411 428 402 
in millions of metric tonnes (Source USDA Grain World Marlets & Trade Aug. 2010) 
World Trade volumes: 
3 Wheat   approx. 120 million MT 
3 Coarse grains approx. 120 million MT 
Total   approx. 240 million MT  
(source USDA Agric. Projections to 2017 . Febr 2008) 
World market volume is approximately 10315 % of total global production/consumption level. (Murphy 
2010) (Meijerink and Danse 2009) 
The multinational companies Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) control approximately 75 % of world 
market trade volume or approximately 180 million MT. (Murphy 2010) 
Biofuel production from grains consumes approximately 100 million MT (2009) 
Food Aid flows represent approximately 6.7 million MT Wheat equivalent or 7310 million MT of grains 
(IFPRI) 
Variability in food grain prices in the world market is normally in the order of 203 0 %. Prices in domestic 
markets are generally more stable. Variability of prices in domestic markets is highest in African countries 
due to poor market functioning and harvest variability. 
The proposed decentralized Emergency Reserves to be coordinated by WFP with a volume of 300.000 – 
500.000 MT would represent only 0.025 % of global consumption. 
The IFPRI proposed ‘virtual reserve’ for intervention in futures/derivates markets with a funding of 12 – 20 
billion US$ would correspond to approximately 30350% of global trade volumes or 703120 million MT.   
                                                 
18 These figures are partly rough estimates. 
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